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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on government spend-
ing in a general equilibrium model with a continuum of industries supplying
tradable and nontradable goods under monopolistic competition. Trade liber-
alization is modeled as the opening up of product markets between two coun-
tries, which may differ in total factor productivity, factor endowment and fix
cost technology. In this setup, I show that the optimal provision of a public
consumption good depends positively on the degree of openness. Moreover, the
richer and more productive country chooses a lower optimal government share.
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1 Introduction
Through the increasing international integration of goods markets new challenges
for the public sector arise. There is a large literature supporting the view that trade
liberalization between countries puts pressure on governments. On the one hand,
the literature on tax competition points out that the integration of markets erodes
the tax base and therefore tends to increase the costs of public goods provision.
While this mechanism has been mainly discussed in the context of capital mobility,
it is clearly also at work when goods market integrate (see Haufler, 2001). On the
other hand, in a seminal paper Rodrik (1998) argues that openness may expose a
country to greater risk, due to terms of trade volatility. In this case, there may be a
need to extend government spending after trade liberalization in order to provide a
social insurance against the external risk.1 Devereux (1991), Anderson et al. (1996)
and Epifani and Gancia (2007) point to a further channel of influence. They argue
that in an open economy, the costs of taxation can be exported if changes in public
spending influence the terms of trade. Similar to Rodrik (1998), these studies point
to a positive impact of trade liberalization on public expenditure.2
While the idea that a country can reduce its costs of public good provision is
intuitively appealing, I show, that it is clearly not only the changes in terms of trade
that can explain this result. Rather, if consumers have a love of variety, an increase
in public expenditures - which lowers domestic employment in the private sector and
the number of domestic firms producing a variety - affects the number of consumed
varieties in open economies by less than in closed ones due to the imports of foreign
varieties. It is clear, that this love of variety effect is larger the more a country is
integrated into the world market.
The variety debate is clearly a central issue in the newer literature. Therefore, it
seems obvious to discuss the effects of trade liberalization on government expendi-
ture in a model which takes into account the existence of varieties within a country.
There is some empirical evidence provided by Epifani and Gancia (2007) that the
positive effect of openness on government consumption depends on the degree of
1The idea that governments provide an insurance against external risk has first come up by
Cameron (1978).
2There is convincing empirical evidence for a positive relationship between the openness for
trade and public expenditure. See for example Cameron (1978), Rodrik (1998), Garrett (2001) and
Epifani and Gancia (2007).
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the share of differentiated products on exports. However, in their theoretical model
Epifani and Gancia (2007) assume that each country produces one variety in every
industry (Armington, 1969) in order to isolate the terms of trade effect. I assume
endogenous product differentiation within countries, i.e., firms produce under mo-
nopolistic competition and there is free entry for firms until profits are equal to zero.
A Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework - applied to intraindustry trade in horizontally
differentiated goods by Krugman (1980) - is used to model monopolistic competi-
tion. For example, in context of the automobile industry, I assume that consumers
decide between BMW, Audi, Ford and Fiat rather than between German, American
or Italian cars, i.e., firms are global players and not countries.3
The effect of openness on government spending is analyzed within a general
equilibrium framework with two possibly asymmetric countries. The countries may
differ in total factor productivity, capital and labor endowment and fix cost technol-
ogy. The measure for openness to trade is obtained, following Epifani and Gancia
(2007), by assuming a continuum of industries of measure 1 whereof an exogenous
fraction splits the industries into tradable and nontradable ones. The advantage of
this measure is to discuss the effects of a marginal increase of openness on public
expenditure - rather than to make only a comparison between autarky and open
economy. I assume, as Epifani and Gancia (2007), that government expenditures
are used for the production of a public consumption good.4
Both production factors, capital and labor, are employed for production of the
private and public consumption goods. A higher government share implies that
more capital and labor is employed for public good production while the labor force
and capital stock for private production is reduced. Hence, fewer firms enter the
market and fewer varieties are produced. This lowers utility of the representative
household if the household has a love of variety.
It follows that, in absence of the effects discussed in the literature so far, optimal
public good provision depends positively on the degree of openness. Because of the
3Empirical investigation of the Armington assumption (product differentiation by country) ver-
sus the Helpman-Krugman assumption (IRS and endogenous product differentiation within country)
found more support for the Helpman and Krugman (1985) assumption. See for example, Feenstra
et al. (2001), Evenett and Keller (2002) and Schott (2004).
4There is some literature examining the role of public infrastructure - in contrast to public
consumption good - in a globalizing world. Under the assumption of monopolistic competition
and increasing returns to scale, Anwar (2001) investigates the effect of public infrastructure on the
pattern of international trade and Egger and Falkinger (2006) discuss the role of public infrastructure
and subsidies for international outsourcing and firm location.
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love of variety, household’s utility is larger the more industries are open to trade.
An increase of government spending in home lowers indeed the number of varieties
in home, however, since the number of foreign varieties consumed remains constant
(for given foreign public expenditure), utility loss in open industries is lower than
in closed ones. This positive love of variety effect induces governments to set a
higher public spending if the country is more open. Furthermore, since a decline in
domestic varieties reduces utility in the foreign country as well, foreign governments
lowers optimal public good provision due to an increase in domestic public good
provision. In addition, I find that in closed economies, the optimal government
share is invariant with respect to the size of the respective economies. Moreover,
if the two countries engage in trade, the richer and more productive country has a
lower optimal government share.
While the costs of public good provision in terms of the number of firms are
equal for closed and open economies, the costs in terms of welfare are lower in
open economies than in closed ones. In contrast to autarky, both governments
increase public spending in open economies on expense of the other country. Since
the countries do not internalize the costs on the welfare of the other country, both
governments act too expansionary in equilibrium. Thus, aggregate welfare would be
higher with cooperation than it is without.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section the theoretical
model is introduced. Section 3 derives the equilibrium values of the variables for
a given government share. In Section 4 benevolent governments in both countries
choose their optimal government share. The Nash equilibrium of the public sector
is analyzed with respect to the asymmetry between the two countries and the pa-
rameters of the economy. Section 5 provides some extensions. On the one hand
the importance of the love of variety versus the market power is illustrated and on
the other hand additional effects with a public sector producing more or less capital
intensive than the private sector are discussed. The last section concludes.
2 The model
There are two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ). In both countries there is a
private and a public sector. The private sector is characterized by a continuum
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of industries of measure 1 indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. In each industry and country
various firms produce differentiated goods with capital and labor under monopolistic
competition. Each firm is monopolist for one variety, after having incurred some
fixed cost. There is free entry, that is, the equilibrium number of firms in an industry
is endogenously determined. I assume free trade between the two countries in an
exogenous fraction τ ∈ [0, 1] of the industries and no trade for the remaining fraction
1− τ . In addition to intraindustry trade, there can be interindustry trade. Without
loss of generality I refer to trading industries with index j ≤ τ and to the nontrading
industries with index j > τ . Thus, τ is the measure for openness. In each country,
there is one country-specific public good which is produced with capital and labor
and which is not tradable. The countries have an endowment K¯i of capital and L¯i
of labor where I assume that both production factors are perfectly mobile within
each country. The subscript i refers to the two countries H and F .
2.1 Endowments, preferences and demand
The representative household owns total endowment of capital (K¯i) and labor (L¯i).
Hence, the household’s income is given by wiL¯i + riK¯i, where wi denotes the wage
rate and ri the rental rate in country i.5 Net income is given by Ii := wiL¯i+riK¯i−Ti,
where Ti denotes the income tax imposed by the government.
The representative household derives utility from consumption of the different
varieties in each industry and a country specific public good denoted by Gi. House-
hold’s preference for private goods versus the public good is captured in the param-
eter η ∈ (0, 1).
Ui = η
∫ 1
0
log Yijdj + (1− η) logGi for i = H,F (1)
where subutility Yij is a CES aggregator of the varieties consumed in industry j
Yij =
 ∑
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν 1ν , i = H,F (2)
with ν ∈ (0, 1). yikj denotes consumption of variety k in industry j by the repre-
5Note that I assume perfect mobility of capital and labor within each country.
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sentative household in country i.6 The elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties from industry j is given by σ = 11−ν . The assumption ν ∈ (0, 1) implies
σ > 1. A higher value of ν implies a lower love of variety, a higher elasticity of
substitution and less market power for any individual firm.7 For ν → 1 goods be-
come perfect substitutes, so that the firms’ monopoly power vanishes, the goods are
perfect substitutes and the households have no love of variety. Within any indus-
try j > τ , the household consumes only the varieties produced in the own country,
within an industry j ≤ τ , the household consumes all varieties produced in country
H and F . Nij is the index set of all varieties from industry j which are available
for consumption in country i. Nij = |Nij | denotes the number of varieties from
industry j consumed in country i. If an industry produces tradables, households in
both countries consume the same varieties. Therefore, for j ≤ τ , NHj = NFj and
NHj = NFj .
Since the elasticity of substitution between the subutilities Yij is equal to 1,
the household allocates its expenditures equally among the industries. Moreover,
since the measure of all industries is equal to 1, this amount equals net income Ii.
Thus, the budget constraint for purchasing varieties from an industry is given by
the equation:
Ii =
∑
k∈Nij
pkjy
i
kj (3)
where pkj is the price of variety k in industry j. In a traded industry the household
spends the budget Ii on all industry specific varieties produced in country H and F ,
whereas in nontraded industries the household spends Ii only on domestic varieties.
Household’s subutility (2) is maximized with respect to yikj , subject to the budget
constraint per industry (3). The resulting demand curve for each variety is given by
yikj =
(
pkj
Pij
) −1
1−ν
Yij , ∀ k ∈ Nij ∧ ∀ j ∈ [0, 1] (4)
6The location of production does not matter for the household’s optimal consumption choice.
7Benassy (1998) introduced a generalization of the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption (eq. (2)) which
allows to disentangle the degree of love of variety on the one hand and the elasticity of substitution
and market power respectively on the other hand. For the tractability of the analysis the Dixit-
Stiglitz assumption is used, keeping in mind that the parameter ν comprises various measures.
For illustration of the importance of the love of variety Section 5.1 provides an analysis using the
Benassy assumption.
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where Pij :=
(∑
k∈Nij (pki)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ is the consumer price index for industry j.8
It may be interpreted as the unit cost function of subutility Yij . Because of free
trade, home and foreign have the same consumer price index in tradable industries:
PHj = PFj for j ≤ τ .
2.2 Production and supply
2.2.1 Public good
The country-specific public good is produced also with capital and labor. Like firms
the public sector takes factor prices as given, which is a common assumption in the
literature. For simplicity, it is assumed that the public good is produced with a
Leontief production function:
Gi = min
{
βigKiK¯i, gLiL¯i
}
(5)
where βi > 0 describes the productivity of capital relative to labor in public good pro-
duction and gKi ∈ (0, 1), gLi ∈ (0, 1) the fraction of the economy’s capital and labor
endowments respectively, which are employed by the public sector. Cost minimizing
production of the public good implies βigKiK¯i = gLiL¯i. Throughout this paper I
assume that βi = L¯iK¯i . This implies that capital intensity in public good production
is equal to the proportion of capital endowment to labor endowment in the country.
Hence, gLi = gKi = gi so that public production is given by Gi = giK¯i = giL¯i and
government expenditures amount to gi(wiL¯i + riK¯i).
At first sight, this simplification may seem arbitrary. However, it has the im-
portant virtue to isolate the interaction between international integration and size
of the public sector from interactions between private and public production, which
arise when the factor proportion supplied to the private sector is distorted by public
production.9
The public good is financed by a lump-sum tax Ti. A balanced budget requires
Ti = gi(wiL¯i + riK¯i).
8The derivation of the demand curve can be found in Appendix A.1.
9Deviations from this assumption imply additional effects which are discussed in Section 5.1.
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2.2.2 Private goods
Each firm in an industry produces one variety with capital and labor according to
a Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing returns to scale
xkj =

Ai(Kkj −K∗i )1−γ(Lkj)γ if Kkj ≥ K∗i and Lkj ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(6)
where xkj denotes output of firm k in industry j located in country H or F , Kkj
(Lkj) is the input of capital (labor) of an individual firm, Ai denotes total factor
productivity in country i and K∗i the overhead capital needed to run the plant. The
corresponding cost function is a linear function in xkj and the fix costs are given by
the rental rate times overhead capital:10
c(wi, ri, xkj) = riK∗i︸ ︷︷ ︸
a0i(ri)
+
(
ri
1− γ
)1−γ (wi
γ
)γ 1
Ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡a1i(ri,wi)
xkj (7)
The firms in a tradable industry face demand of both countries while firms in a
nontradable sector face only domestic demand:
xkj =
 y
i
kj = Yij
(
pkj
Pij
) −1
1−ν
j > τ
yikj + y
i′
kj =
(
Yij + Yi′j
) (pkj
Pj
) −1
1−ν
j ≤ τ
(8)
(Recall that in the trading industries PHj = PFj . Therefore, the country index can
be skipped.) Assuming that the potential number of firms is large, an individual
firm takes as given aggregate industry supply and the price index. Firms maximize
profit for given Yij and Pij , i = H,F
max
xkj
pkjxkj − a1ixkj − a0i. (9)
subject to market demand (8). Solving the profit maximization problem yields for
the optimal price:
pkj = pi =
a1i
ν
, (10)
which is independent of firm and industry. Free firm entry implies zero profits
10The derivation of the cost function can be found in Appendix A.2.
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in equilibrium. This determines the quantity produced by each firm xkj which is
identical for all firms within a country, independent of industry.
xkj = xi =
a0iν
a1i(1− ν) (11)
Using equation (11) and the definition for marginal cost a1i, conditional factor de-
mand simplifies to
Li
(
ri
wi
)
=
γν
1− ν
ri
wi
K∗i (12)
Ki = K∗i
1− γν
1− ν . (13)
While the demand for labor depends on the relative factor prices, demand for capital
is independent of the factor prices.
2.3 Macroeconomic equilibrium conditions
2.3.1 Capital and labor market
Since government employs giK¯i and giL¯i for public good production, (1− gi)K¯i and
(1 − gi)L¯i remains available for production of private goods. The full employment
condition for capital and labor in i = H,F is given by
(1− gi)K¯i =
∫ 1
0
nijKidj (14)
(1− gi)L¯i =
∫ 1
0
nijLidj (15)
where nij is the equilibrium number of firms in industry j and country i which has
not yet been determined. Combining equation (13) and (14) we obtain the absolute
number of firms in each country which is given by the following expression
∫ 1
0
nijdj =
(1− gi)K¯i
K∗i
1− ν
1− γν . (16)
Using (16) and (12) in equation (15), we have for the factor price ratio
ri
wi
=
1− νγ
νγ
L¯i
K¯i
, (17)
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which gives for the labor demand of a firm
Li =
1− γν
1− ν K
∗
i
L¯i
K¯i
. (18)
Equation (17) implies that γν = wiL¯i
wiL¯i+riK¯i
, the share of labor income in total income
is identical in the two economies. The higher the elasticity of output with respect to
labor input (γ) and the lower the market power of firms (i.e. the higher ν) the higher
is the wage share. Moreover, substituting (17) for w/r in the expression defining
a1i(r, w) and using the result in (11), we obtain for the output of an individual firm
xi =
φ
1− νAiK
∗
i
(
L¯i
K¯i
)γ
i = H,F (19)
with φ := (ν(1− γ))1−γ(1− νγ)γ .
2.3.2 Demand
In a closed industry, consumption of a variety is equal to its production, given by
(19). It remains to show how consumption of a variety in a open industry is split
between the two representative households. From now on I denote consumption of a
variety in closed industries with xH and xF , respectively, and demand for varieties
in open industries by yik, k = H,F and i = H,F , where k refers to the location of
production and i to the location of consumption of the variety. Dividing household’s
H budget constraint for a tradable industry through the one of household F
IH
IF
=
nHjpHy
H
H + nFjpF y
H
F
nHjpHyFH + nFjpF y
F
F
and using equation (A1) to replace yHF by
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν
yHH and y
F
F by
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν
yFH , we
see that consumption of in H relative to consumption in F of a variety produced in
H is equal to the relative income:
yHH
yFH
=
IH
IF
.
Using the equation for market clearing in a tradable industry, xH = yHH + y
F
H ,
10
and the relation y
H
H
yHF
=
(
pF
pH
) 1
1−ν we get the demand for tradable varieties:
(yHH , y
H
F ) =
(
IHxH
IF + IH
,
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν IHxH
IF + IH
)
(yFH , y
F
F ) =
(
IFxH
IF + IH
,
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν IFxH
IF + IH
) (20)
2.3.3 Trade account
Trade occurs because households love varieties. In open industries, a household
spreads its consumption over all produced varieties in both countries. In equilibrium,
the value of exports must equal the value of imports. In other words, the number of
varieties times price times consumption of the varieties produced in country i and
consumed in country i′, integrated over all traded industries, must equal the number
of varieties times price times consumption of the varieties produced in country i′ and
consumed in country i, integrated over all traded industries.
∫ τ
0
piy
i′
i nijdj =
∫ τ
0
pi′y
i
i′ni′jdj (21)
We may rewrite the trade account condition by using the budget constraint for
purchases from a tradable industry, Ii = nijpiyii + ni′jpi′y
i
i′ , taking the integral
from 0 to τ on both sides, and combining the result with (21). This yields τIi =∫ τ
0 nijpi
(
yii + y
i′
i
)
dj. Since yii + y
i′
i = xi, this reduces to:
∫ τ
0
nijdj =
τIi
pixi
. (22)
Using (22) in (21) the trade account becomes yFH
IH
xH
= yHF
IF
xF
. Combining this with
(20), we finally get
xF
xH
=
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν
. (23)
3 Positive analysis
In each nontraded industry an equal number of firms enters the market in equi-
librium. The households spend an equal amount on each industry and prices and
quantities produced are constant for all industries, Ii = nijpixi. In the tradable
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industries only the average number of firms per industry is determined. According
to (22), 1τ
∫ τ
0 nijdj =
Ii
pixi
. It follows that the number of firms in each nontradable
industry (denoted as ni,j>τ ) is equal to the total number of firms per country (see
equation (16)) denoted by ni. We have
1
τ
∫ τ
0
nijdj = ni,j>τ = ni =
(1− gi)K¯i
K∗i
1− ν
1− γν . (24)
The location of the firms in single tradable industries is undetermined. Interindustry
trade allows that firms in one tradable industry are mainly located in H while in
others are located more in F , as long as the location pattern is consistent with (22).
The higher capital endowment or the lower overhead capital required to run the
plant the higher is the number of firms in equilibrium. The endowment left to the
private sector is decisive for the number of firms in the in the market. If the size of
the public sector expands, less firms are active in the private sector.
Each firm producing a positive amount in equilibrium supplies
xi =
φ
1− νAiK
∗
i
(
L¯i
K¯i
)γ
i = H,F
where I defined φ = (ν(1 − γ))1−γ(1 − νγ)γ .11 The supply of each variety depends
positively on the amount of overhead capital and productivity, and declines if capital
supply is scarce relative to labor endowment. Note that only the factor proportion
matters - not the absolute level of endowments. The assumption that the public
sector does not distort the factor proportion implies that the size of the public
sector does not affect equilibrium output per firm - in contrast to the number of
firms.
For the nume´raire I choose the price of home varieties. Setting pH = 1, the
marginal cost is equal to a1H = λH = ν. Hence the equilibrium rental and wage
rate are12
rH = φAH
(
L¯H
K¯H
)γ
wH =
φνγ
1− νγAH
(
K¯H
L¯H
)1−γ
,
11Note that xi =
ν
1−ν (1− γ)1−γγγAiK∗i
(
ri
wi
)γ
.
12Note that ri = λi(1− γ)1−γγγAi
(
ri
wi
)γ
,and wi = λi(1− γ)1−γγγAi
(
wi
ri
)1−γ
.
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respectively. The trade account condition xFxH =
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν determines the price of
foreign varieties in terms of the fundamentals of the economy:
pF =
(
AH
AF
(
L¯HK¯F
K¯HL¯F
)γ
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν
.
Note, since the price of domestic varieties is normalized, pF is equal to the relative
price of foreign to domestic varieties. The more productive and the more capital-
rich is F relative to H, the lower is the relative price of foreign goods. Moreover,
prices in foreign are low, ceteris paribus, if overhead capital is high in F . High
overhead capital reduces the number of firms in F and increases output xF per firm,
which can only be sold if the price of the foreign varieties decreases as well. A low
price requires that marginal cost is low. Through this channel high fixed capital
requirements depress factor returns.
Equation (10) together with (17) determines the rental rate and wage rate in
country F : rF = φAF
(
L¯F
K¯F
)γ
pF and wF = φνγ1−νγAF
(
K¯F
L¯F
)1−γ
pF . Substituting pF ,
we have
rF = φAνFA
1−ν
H
(
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν ( L¯H
K¯H
)γ(1−ν)(
L¯F
K¯F
)γν
wF =
φνγ
1− νγA
ν
FA
1−ν
H
(
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν ( L¯H
K¯H
)γ(1−ν)(
K¯F
L¯F
)1−νγ
Comparing this with H, we see that both factor returns are low if overhead capital
in F is high relative to overhead capital in H. The net incomes are given by
Ii(gi) = (1− gi) φ1− νγAi(K¯i)
1−γ(L¯i)γpi
To summarize, an increase in public spending (higher gi) has only a variety effect
- the equilibrium number of firms decreases. Supply of commodities and its prices,
as well as wage and rental rates do not depend on the public good provision. This
feature depends on the very special assumption of βi = L¯iK¯i which implies that the
capital intensity for public good production is equal to the capital intensity country
endowments. Since the factor prices depend on the relative factor availability for
private production and as long as government does not affect this relative availability,
government won’t have an effect on market prices.
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4 Optimal public good provision
4.1 Governments optimization problem
I assume a benevolent government whose aim is to provide a quantity of the pub-
lic good that maximizes the utility of the representative household. Government’s
choice parameter is gi, the fraction of capital and labor used for public good produc-
tion. Having determined the equilibrium values in the last section we can describe
the indirect subutilities for traded and nontraded industries as follows:13
Yi,j>τ (gi) = (ni(gi))
1
ν xi
Yi,j≤τ (gH , gF ) =
(
IH(gH)+IF (gF )
Ii(gi)
) 1
ν
−1
(ni(gi))
1
ν xi
(25)
where i = H,F . Note that
(
IH(gH)+IF (gF )
Ii(gi)
) 1
ν
−1
> 1. Since the household loves
varieties, subutility in open industries is higher than in closed ones. Ceteris paribus,
this difference is higher the poorer the country. It follows that richer countries do
gain less from trade than poorer countries.
Government in country i chooses gi such as to maximize the utility of the rep-
resentative household in country i taken as given government spending in the other
country gi′ , i, i′ ∈ H,F and i 6= i′.
max
gi
ητ log Yi,j≤τ (gi) + η(1− τ) log Yi,j>τ (gH , gF ) + (1− η) logGi(gi) (26)
Governments maximization of the household’s utility yields the following first
order condition:
ϑi := ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)Ωi′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−η
ν
1
1− gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− η) 1
gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0 (27)
where I defined
Ωi′ :=
(
Ai′
Ai
)ν (K∗i
K∗i′
)1−ν (K¯i′
K¯i
)1−γν (
L¯i′
L¯i
)γν
for i, i′ ∈ H,F and i 6= i′. The asymmetry of the two countries is captured in Ωi.
Note that only relative differences in the fundamentals affects government expendi-
13See Section A.3 in Appendix for the derivation of the subutility in open industries.
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Figure 1: Governmental reaction functions
tures. The third term in equation (27) represents the positive marginal utility of a
higher supply of the public good. The second term represents the marginal utility
loss due to the crowding out of private firms in tradable and nontradable industries.
As we discussed before, the average number of firms in equilibrium is lower with
higher public production. The first bracket is positive and dampens the negative
effect of the second term. This positive effect comes from the fact that domestic
public production affects only the number of domestic firms - not the number of
available foreign varieties. Since households have a love for varieties, utility in open
industries is higher than in closed ones and due to the crowding out of domestic
firms, the number of domestic relative to foreign varieties decreases which increases
the relative utility gain in open industries. This dampening effect is larger the higher
the integration of the goods market which is measured by τ . By inspecting equation
(27), it can be seen, that the effect of the asymmetry between countries on optimal
government share vanishes if ν → 1, i.e. in a situation under perfect competition and
no love of variety. Then, optimal government share is given by g = 1− η, identical
for both countries.
For any given gi′ equation (27) has one solution at which the second order con-
dition for a maximum holds. The two reaction functions gH(gF , τ, ν, η,ΩF ) and
gF (gH , τ, ν, η,ΩH) which correspond to the maximum are illustrated in figure 1.14
14The proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is found in the Appendix A.5.
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Proposition 1. Domestic optimal government share depends negatively on foreign
optimal government share if τ > 0.
Proof. This can be easily shown by applying the implicit function theorem on the
first order condition (equation (27)).
dgi
dgi′
= −
−ητ 1−νν Ωi′((1−gi)+(1−gi′ )Ωi′ )2
∂ϑi
∂gi
The expression ∂ϑi∂gi is the second order condition which is negative at the optimum
level of gi. Therefore, dgidgi′ < 0.
The higher government expenditure in the foreign country the less firms enter
the market to produce a variety in country F . Hence, households utility in coun-
try H and F is lower since they consume less varieties. Taking this into account,
government in H sets a lower gH .
For a first investigation of the optimal government share in a single country it
is interesting to look at the symmetric case. If the two countries are identical, we
are able to calculate explicitly the equilibrium value of the Nash game of the public
sector.
4.2 Symmetric countries
The asymmetry is captured in the parameter Ωi′ which is equal to 1 for fully sym-
metric countries. In this case gH = gF = g is a mutually best response of both
governments. This optimal g is given by
g =
1− η
1 + η 1−νν (1− τ2 )
(28)
Since households love varieties, subutility in open industries is higher than in a closed
industry. Thus, the more open a country the higher is aggregate utility. This lowers
the trade-off for governments, which results in a higher gi.
∂g
∂τ
=
(1− η)η(1− ν)ν
2(ν + η(1− ν)(1− τ/2))2 > 0
Optimal government expenditure in a closed economy (τ = 0) is equal to g =
1−η
1−η+ η
ν
. The effect of openness on government expenditure plays together with the
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elasticity of substitution or love of variety respectively. The higher ν the higher is
government spending. A higher ν means lower love of variety and a higher elasticity
of substitution
∂g
∂ν
=
(1− η)η(1− τ/2)
(ν + η(1− ν)(1− τ/2))2 > 0
To conclude (proof in the text)
Proposition 2. In a symmetric equilibrium dgdτ > 0 and
dg
dν > 0.
While in my analysis optimal public good provision depends positively on the
elasticity of substitution between varieties, in Epifani and Gancia (2007) public
good provision depends negatively on the elasticity of substitution between export
and import goods. Note, that Epifani and Gancia assume product differentiation
by country and hence, the elasticity of substitution is a measure for the monopoly
power of countries vis a` vis other countries. This power is important for the terms
of trade effect. They argue that a lower elasticity of substitution between exports
and imports allows to a country higher wages and prices in respond to higher labor
demand by governments. There is no variety effect in Epifani and Gancia, since the
number of varieties (equal to the number of countries) is exogenous in their model.
In contrast, in my analysis the number of firms in equilibrium is endogenous and
depend on public spending. As a consequence, optimal expenditure in my model is
driven through the variety effect.15 There is no terms of trade effect of the public
sector in my model (since market prices do not react on government activity). In my
model, the terms of trade are determined by the relative productivity, the capital
overhead and the factor proportion of the two countries.
4.3 Asymmetric countries
Having obtained an insight for the effect of the different parameters on government
spending in a symmetric equilibrium, I now turn to the asymmetric case. Note,
that only the relative difference between the two countries enters the first order
condition. I first consider some limiting cases where the countries are infinitely
different. If Ωi′ → 0, i.e. country i is infinitely richer than country i′, the solution
15Remind that the parameter ν captures different measures: on the one hand the love of variety
and on the other the elasticity of substitution and market power respectively. A higher love of
variety goes hand in hand with a lower elasticity of substitution which is a lower ν. Section 5.1
disentangles the two effects and illustrates the importance of the love of variety for a positive
correlation between openness and optimal government share.
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for gi (given by (27)) reduces to 1−η1+η 1−ν
ν
. Since (Ωi)−1 = Ωi′ , Ωi′ → 0 implies
Ωi → ∞. Therefore, the solution for gi′ is given by 1−η1+η 1−ν
ν
(1−τ) . To summarize,
while for the infinitely rich country the degree of openness does not affect government
spending, the infinitely poor country does benefit from more openness. Further, in
this limiting cases, domestic optimal government share is independent of foreign
government share. This result is intuitively clear.
Proposition 3 summarizes the effects of the asymmetry between the two countries
on the Nash equilibrium of the public sector.
Proposition 3. The richer and more productive is country i relative to the country
i′ (lower Ωi′ ), the lower is optimal government share in country i and the higher in
country i′.
Proof. Again, the implicit function theorem is applied on the first order condition
for given public foreign expenditure to get
dgi
dΩi′
∣∣∣∣
gi′constant
= −
−ητ 1−νν −(1−gi′ )((1−gi)+(1−gi′ )Ωi′ )2
∂ϑi
∂gi
> 0
The expression ∂ϑi∂gi is the second order condition which is negative at the optimum
level of gi. Neglecting the effect of Ωi′ on gi′ the result above means that for given
gi′ optimal gi is higher the higher Ωi′ . Since Ωi′ = (Ωi)−1 and because of the
symmetry, a higher Ωi′ leads to a lower gi′ for any given gi. The lower gi′ due to
the higher Ωi′ has an additional positive effect on gi as I have shown in proposition
1. Hence, any change in the fundamentals, which makes country i′ bigger (higher
K¯i′/K¯i and L¯i′/L¯i) and more productive (higher Ai′/Ai and lower K∗i′/K
∗
i ) lowers
the equilibrium value of gi and increases gi′ . Graphically the reaction function gi(gi′)
rotates outwards and gi′(gi) rotates inwards.
A lower overhead capital in H, for instance, raises the number of varieties in
H. The number of firms entering the market increases, output per variety falls
and prices increases due to the increase in marginal costs. Since income in country
H increases the demand for varieties in country F , while production in F stays
constant, prices in country F , wage and rental rate increase.
It is obvious from equation (27) that for given foreign government share a higher
τ results in a higher optimal domestic government share. That is, the reaction
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functions rotate outwards if τ increases. However, since the curves are negatively
sloped it is not a priori clear whether openness does increase government spending
in both countries. The symmetric case already showed that openness has a positive
effect on optimal government spending in equilibrium. The limiting asymmetry cases
show that the infinitely rich country does not benefit from openness and therefore,
government spending does not depend on openness. While the optimal government
share of the infinitely poor country depends positively on τ . It follows that
dgi
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ωi′→∞
>
dgi
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ωi′=1
>
dgi
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ωi′→0
= 0 .
which let conjecture that the effect of openness on optimal government share is
decreasing in the relative size of of the country. I provide some simulation outcomes
(see figure 2) which support the conjecture that d
2gi
dτdΩi′
> 0 and dgidτ > 0 ∀ Ωi′ 6= 0.
1 5 10
Wi¢
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
dgi
dΤ
Figure 2: Effect of τ on optimal gi subject to Ωi′ (ν = 0.7, τ = 0.3, η = 0.6). The
plot looks qualitatively the same for various values of ν, τ, η ∈ (0, 1).
4.4 Welfare
In the previous section we discussed optimal public good provision from a country’s
point of view. Optimal public good provision increases with openness since the
more a country is integrated into the world market (higher τ), the more costs of
public good provision are exported. Since governments do not internalize the costs
which are on expense of the other country, there is overprovision of the public good
in equilibrium. If the governments in the two countries cooperate they would set
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optimally gH = gF =
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η which is equal to the level in autarky. Comparing
welfare under non-cooperative and cooperative governments, aggregate welfare is
higher with cooperation than without.
5 Extensions
5.1 Love of variety vs. market power
The aim of this Section is to examine the role of market power and love of variety. In
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case we are not able to distinguish between the two effects.
Therefore, I follow Benassy (1998) who introduced a generalization of the Dixit-
Stiglitz assumption. The nice and special feature of this extension is to disentangle
the parameter for monopolistic power from the one for “love of variety”. Under the
Benassy extension the subutility is given by
Yij = (Nij)
ρ+1− 1
ν
 ∑
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν 1ν , i = H,F. (29)
The “love of variety” is captured in the parameter ρ. If ρ is equal to zero there
is no love of variety and if ρ = 1−νν we are back to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case.
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The demand curve for a variety changes as follows
yikj = (Nij)
ρ ν
1−ν−1
(
pkj
Pij
) −1
1−ν
Yij ∀ k ∈ Nij ∧ ∀ j ∈ [0, 1] (30)
where Pij := (Nij)
−ρ+ 1
σ−1
(∑
k∈Nij (pki)
1−σ
) 1
1−σ is the price index per industry
and may be interpreted as the unit cost function of the subutility Yij (29).
Compared to the results presented so far, the subutilities for traded and non
tradable industries change as follows:
Yi,j>τ (gi) = (ni)
ρ+1 xi
Yi,j≤τ (gH , gF ) =
(
nH+nF
ni
)ρ (
(IH+IF )ni
Ii(nH+nF )
) 1
ν
−1
Yi,j>τ (gi)
(31)
for i = H,F and note that ni and Ii are both functions of gi. Subutility in closed
industries depends positively on the love of variety while the parameter for market
16See Montagna (2001) for a discussion of the welfare effects from trade under the two cases,
Dixit-Stiglitz versus no love of variety. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have ρ = 0.
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power has no direct effect. Note however that ν affects ni. When there is no love of
variety, ρ = 0, it is not clear anymore whether subutility in open industries is higher
than in closed ones. Whether (IH+IF )niIi(nH+nF ) is greater or smaller than 1, depends on the
relative prices of foreign and domestic varieties. Substituting Ii = nipixi, i = H,F ,
and using (23)
(Ii + Ii′)ni
Ii(ni + ni′)
=
ni + ni′
(
pi
pi′
) ν
1−ν
ni + ni′
(32)
which is greater than 1 if pi > pi′ and smaller than 1 if pi < pi′ . In words, if
the average price in open industries is lower than in closed ones, subutility in open
industries is higher than in closed industries. Recalling that the relative price of
foreign to domestic varieties is equal to pF =
(
AH
AF
(
L¯HK¯F
K¯H L¯F
)γ K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν
, the term (32)
for a household in H is greater than 1 if, anything equal, H is more capital rich, less
productive in AH or overhead capital requirement is lower.
Governments maximization of the household’s utility (equation (26) subject to
(31)) yields following first order condition:
φi := ητρ
(
1
1− gi −
1
(1− gi) + (1− gi′)κi′
)
+ ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
(1− gi) + (1− gi′)κi′ −
1
(1− gi) + (1− gi′)Ωi′
)
− η(ρ+ 1) 1
1− gi + (1− η)
1
gi
= 0
(33)
where we defined
Ωi′ :=
(
Ai′
Ai
)ν (K∗i
K∗i′
)1−ν (K¯i′
K¯i
)1−γν (
L¯i′
L¯i
)γν
κi′ :=
K¯i′K
∗
i
K¯iK∗i′
for i, i′ ∈ {H,F} and i 6= i′. As before, the last term in equation (33) captures
the positive marginal utility of a higher supply of the public good. The third term
captures the marginal utility loss due to the crowding out of private firms in each
tradable and nontradable industry. It illustrates, that the crowding out effect is
driven by the love of variety and not by the elasticity of substitution. The first term
in (27) (derived under the assumption of ρ = 1−νν ) combined the first two terms
in (33). The first term in (33) is positive and captures the love of variety effect
in open industries. The second term, which I call the income effect, is positive if
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the inequality κi′ < Ωi′ holds which is equal to the inequality pi′ < pi .17 If the
fundamentals of the economy are such that the price of foreign varieties is smaller
than the price of domestic varieties, the income effect is positive since a relative low
price of foreign varieties implies a decrease of the average price in opening industries.
If foreign varieties are more expensive than domestic ones the income effect will be
negative. The price differential of the two countries has an effect as long as the firms
have market power, i.e. ν < 1. It is obvious that if the income effect is positive for
country H, it is negative for country F and vice versa.
Consider for a moment the case without love of variety, hence ρ = 0. The first
term in (33) disappears. Openness affects government expenditure only through the
income effect. Openness to trade does not necessarily affect government spending
positively. If foreign prices are lower than domestic ones, there are gains from trade
for the domestic country and the domestic optimal government share does increase
in openness. In contrast optimal government share of the foreign country decreases
in openness.
Equation (33) illustrates that if the love of variety is sufficiently large (which is
definitely the case under the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption (see Section 4)) there are gains
from trade for both countries and government spending is larger in open economies
than in closed ones.
If the countries are symmetric, then κi = 1 and Ωi = 1 and the second term
in the first order condition (eq. (33)) disappears. Thus, in a world of identical
countries the degree of market power or elasticity of substitution has no effect on
optimal public good provision. The optimal g is given by
g =
1− η
1 + ηρ(1− τ/2) (34)
The effect of openness on government expenditure plays together with ρ, the pa-
rameter for “love of variety”. If individuals have no love of variety, openness won’t
have an effect on government spending. The higher ρ, i.e. the higher the “love of
variety”, the lower is optimal government spending. The effect of trade on govern-
ment spending is stronger the higher the love of variety since marginal utility of
open industries is higher if ρ is high: ∂
2g
∂ρ∂τ > 0. This result makes clear that the
17This can be seen after some rearranging:
κi′ < Ωi′ ⇔ K¯i′K
∗
i
K¯iK
∗
i′
<
(
Ai′
Ai
)ν (
K∗i
K∗
i′
)ν ( K¯i′
K¯i
)1−γν ( L¯i′
L¯i
)γν
⇔ 1 <
(
pi
pi′
) ν
1−ν
.
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positive relation between ν and public spending derived before is driven by the love
of variety and not by the elasticity of substitution.
To conclude (proof in the text)
Proposition 4. In a symmetric equilibrium where both countries are totally iden-
tical, optimal government spending depends negatively on the parameter for love of
variety. Further, optimal government spending depends not on the elasticity of sub-
stitution. Openness has a positive effect on optimal government size if consumers
have a love of variety.
5.2 βi 6= L¯K¯
The equilibrium derived in this paper was under the assumption that government
activity does not distort the relative factor endowment available for private produc-
tion. This was an important assumption in order to focus on interactions between
openness on the government sector without having a distortion of the government
sector on prices and supply. The only effect of an increase in government activity
was due to the crowding out of private firms. The aim of this Section is to analyze
the additional effects of government activity if public good production is more labor
intensive or more capital intensive than the private sector. Consider equation (5).
A large βi implies that productivity of capital is large which in turn implies that
employment of capital in public good production is low.
Remind that cost minimizing production implies that
gLi = gKi
βiK¯i
L¯i
The share of labor endowment is increasing in the share of capital endowment. In
contrast to before, βi is allowed to differ from L¯iK¯i and gKi = gLi does no longer hold.
The inequality βi < L¯iK¯i implies that gLi < gKi which means that the public sector
is more capital intensive than the private sector. If βi > L¯iK¯i the reverse holds.
Production of a public good is thus given by
Gi = gKi
βK¯i
L¯i
= gLiL¯i.
The factor proportions supplied to the private sector is (1−gKi)K¯i
(1−gLi)L¯i with gLi =
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gKi
βiK¯i
L¯i
. As before, there is one public choice parameter since there is a one-to-
one correspondance between gKi and gLi. Having determined the share of capital
endowment for public good production the share of labor endowment is determined.
Therefore, in the following gLi is replaced by gKi βiK¯iL¯i . This implies for the relative
factor prices
ri
wi
=
1− νγ
νγ
L¯i
K¯i
Bi ,
where I defined Bi :=
1−gKiβ K¯iL¯i
1−gKi . Since the supply of a variety and labor demand of a
firm depends on the relative factor prices, it is now affected by government activity.
xi =
φ
1− νAiK
∗
i
(
L¯i
K¯i
)γ
Bγi
and
Li =
1− γν
1− ν K
∗
i
L¯i
K¯i
Bi .
The fact that supply and labor demand are affected by the relative factor prices and
therefore by government activity depends on the assumption of the non-homothetic
cost function. A firm’s demand for capital is still given by (13) and the number of
firms is given by equation (24) with gi replaced by gKi. The rental and wage rates
are given by
ri = φAi
(
L¯i
K¯i
)γ
Bγi pi wi =
φνγ
1− νγAi
(
K¯i
L¯i
)1−γ
Bγ−1i pi
The price of foreign varieties depends on the public share of home and foreign:
pF =
(
AH
AF
(
BHL¯HK¯F
BF K¯HL¯F
)γ
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν
.
Under the assumption of βi = L¯iK¯i , government activity does only influence the
number of firms producing a variety in equilibrium. However, if we allow for βi 6= L¯iK¯i ,
there is no equilibrium variable which stays unaffected by the government share. For
analyzing the effect of government activity we have to distinguish two cases: βi > L¯iK¯i
and βi < L¯iK¯i .
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Case 1: βi >
L¯i
K¯i
Recall that if βi > L¯iK¯i , the public sector produces more labor intensive than the
private sector, that is gKi < gLi. There is proportionally less labor available for the
private sector which implies a lower relative wage rate compared to the case where
βi = L¯iK¯i . Consider an increase in government activity. An expansion of the public
sector increases gLi by more than gKi and hence the the factor proportions supplied
to the private sector (given by B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
) increases. This implies that the rental rate
decreases and the wage rate increases. Of course, the number of firms decreases with
an increase in public good production.18 The supply of each variety is decreasing in
the factor proportion B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
and hence decreases with an expansion of the public
sector if βi > L¯iK¯i . In addition, for given public spending in country F , an expansion
of the government sector in H lowers the price of foreign varieties. Hence, govern-
ment spending has a terms of trade improvement if the public sector produces more
labor intensive. The same holds from the perspective of the foreign country. An
increase in the public sector in F for given government size in H increases pF .
Case 2: βi < L¯iK¯i
If βi < L¯iK¯i , the public sector produces more capital intensive than the private sector:
gLi < gKi. An expansion of the public sector increases gLi by less than gKi and hence
the factor proportions supplied to the private sector (given by B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
) decreases if
the government share increases. This implies that the rental rate increases and
the wage rate decreases. Again, the number of firms decreases with an increase
in public good production. The supply of each variety is decreasing in the factor
proportion B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
and hence increases with an expansion of the public sector if
βi <
L¯i
K¯i
. In contrast to the case 1 where the government sector produces more
capital intensive than the private sector, an increases in the government size (given
foreign government size) results in a deterioration of the terms of trade.
6 Conclusion
I set up a Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model with two heterogeneous countries, tradable
and nontradable industries, endogenous product differentiation within each country
18As long as the public sector employs capital for production, there is a crowding out effect of
private firms.
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and consumers with a love of variety. In this framework, the effect of openness to
trade on optimal public good provision is analyzed. The measure for openness is
obtained by assuming a continuum of industries of measure one whereof an exogenous
fraction is tradable. This allows to explicitly express optimal government spending
- from a country’s perspective - as a function of the trade openness. In addition,
due to the assumption of heterogeneous countries, we are able discuss the effects of
heterogeneity between countries on optimal public good provision.
Different channels how openness may affect government spending are discussed
in the literature. The idea that in open economies government expansion may be
achieved on expense of the welfare of other countries due to terms of trade effect
is familiar. However, I show that under the assumption of endogenous firm entry
and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the cost of public good provision may be exported
due to the love of variety effect. Since a governmental expansion crowds out only
domestic varieties the number of available varieties for consumption decreases by less
in open economies. The costs of public good provision are lower the more industries
are open. Hence, government spending depends positively on openness as long as
consumers have a love of variety. Further, since the gains from trade are larger for
a small and poor country, the smaller country’s optimal government share is higher.
The possibility of governments to export the costs of public good provision results
in an equilibrium where both governments act too expansionary. An agreement
between the two governments reducing government activity in both countries would
lead to a higher aggregate welfare.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the demand curve (eq. (4))
Maximization of household’s subutility (2) with respect to yikj , subject to the budget
constraint per industry (3), yields the following first order conditions
(
Yij
yikj
)1−ν
= µijpkj ∀ k ∈ Nij ∧ ∀ j ∈ [0, 1]
where µij denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint
per industry (3). It can be interpreted as marginal utility of income spent on industry
j. Taking the first order conditions for any two varieties k and k′ we get
yikj
yik′j
=
(
pk′j
pkj
) 1
1−ν
(A1)
Consumption of variety k equals the one of variety k′ if the prices of the two varieties
are identical. Using equation (A1) and (2) we get for each variety the demand curve.
A.2 Derivation of the cost function (eq. (7))
A necessary condition for profit maximization of firms is to minimize the costs,
riKkj + wiLkj , subject to technology (6). For an interior solution (Kkj > K∗i and
Lkj > 0), the cost minimizing problem yields the following first order conditions
ri = λi(1− γ)Ai(Kkj −K∗i )−γ(Lkj)γ
wi = λiγAi(Kkj −K∗i )1−γ(Lkj)γ−1
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with equation (6), that is, marginal
cost of output. For the MRTS follows
ri
wi
=
1− γ
γ
(Lkj)
(Kkj −K∗i )
.
Hence conditional factor demand is given by
Lkj(wi, ri, xkj) =
1
Ai
(
γri
(1− γ)wi
)1−γ
xkj
Kkj(wi, ri, xkj) = K∗i +
1
Ai
(
(1− γ)wi
γri
)γ
xkj .
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The cost function is thus given by
c(wi, ri, xkj) = riK∗i +
(
ri
1− γ
)1−γ (wi
γ
)γ 1
Ai
xkj
Note that marginal cost,
(
ri
1−γ
)1−γ (
wi
γ
)γ
1
Ai
, is equal to the Lagrange multiplier λi.
A.3 Derivation of the subutility in open industries
YH,j≤τ =
(
nHj
(
yHH
)ν
+ nFj
(
yHF
)ν) 1ν
= yHH
(
nHj + nFj
(
pH
pF
) ν
1−ν
) 1
ν
Using IH = pHnHxH = nHjpHyHH + nFjpF y
H
F and y
H
F =
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν
yHH implies
nHxH
yHH
= nH + nF
(
pH
pF
) ν
1−ν
.
The same argument holds for country F . Hence nF xF
yFH
= nHj + nFj
(
pH
pF
) ν
1−ν . After
substituting yiH , i = H,F , we get the subutility in open industries in expression
(25).
A.4 Derivation of the first order condition (eq. (27))
We first rewrite the objective function of the government in the form:
max
gi
ητ
1− ν
ν
(log(IH(gH) + IF (gF ))− log Ii(gi))+η log (ni(gi))
1
ν xi+(1−η) logGi(gi)
The first order condition of this problem is given by:
0 = ητ
1− ν
ν
(
∂ log(IH + IF )
∂gi
− ∂ log Ii
∂gi
)
+
η
ν
∂ni
∂gi
+ (1− η)∂ logGi
∂gi
This yields equation (27). After rearranging terms the following quadratic equation
results:
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0 = g2i (ν(1− η) + η)
+ gi((ητ(1− ν)− η)(1− gi′)Ωi′ − η − (1− η)ν − ν(1− η)(1 + (1− gi′)Ωi′))
+ ν(1− η)(1 + (1− gi′)Ωi′)
=:g2i a+ gibi′ + ci′
(A2)
A.5 Proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Equation (A2) has two solutions:
g1i(gi′) =
−bi′ +
√
b2i′ − 4aci′
2a
and g2i(gi′) =
−bi′ −
√
b2i′ − 4aci′
2a
where g1i(gi′) > g2i(gi′). The two solutions at gi′ = 1 are g1i(gi′ = 1) = 1 and
g2i(gi′ = 1) =
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η < 1. While the second order condition at gi = 1 and gi′ = 1
is positive, it is negative at gi =
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η and gi′ = 1. Hence, the solution g2i
corresponds to the maximum. In proposition 1 it is shown that dgidgi′ > 0 which
implies that the solution g1i > 1 for gi′ ∈ [0, 1). Proposition 1 implies also that
g2i >
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η for gi′ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, it remains to show that g2i < 1 at gi′ = 0.
The proof follows by contradiction.
Suppose that g2i ≥ 1 at gi′ = 0, then g2i(gi′) = 1 for gi′ ∈ [0, 1) because of
g2i(gi′ = 1) =
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η < 1 and the result of proposition 1. However, solving
g2i(gi′) = 1 for gi′ yields gi′ = 1, which is a contradiction.
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